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POST-EMPLOYMENT COVENANTS NOT TO
COMPETE - THE OKLAHOMA VIEW:
BA YL Y, MARTIN & FA Y INC. v. PICKARD
I.

INTRODUCTION

A post-employment restrictive covenant limits a party's ability to
pursue his or her profession.' Historically, these covenants have been
considered against the public's best interest because they reduce competition in the market place.2 Once identified as against public policy, the
covenants were regarded as illegal restraints on trade3 and prohibited by

both legislative and judicial action.4 This rigid approach created an unjust hardship for parties with legitimate employment interests.5 Upon

recognizing the injustice, courts began to preserve those covenants found
to be reasonable restraints on trade. This type of judicial preservation

has evolved into what is now the majority view in the United States.6
Today, most courts allow post-employment restrictive covenants to be
judicially modified in an effort to preserve reasonable contractual
7
restrictions.
1. The purpose of post-employment restrictive covenants:
is not to prevent the competitive use of the unique personal qualities of the employees either during or after the employment - but to prevent competitive use, for a time, of
information or relationships which pertain peculiarly to the employer and which the employee acquired in the course of the employment.
Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HAv. L. REv. 625, 647 (1960). See also D. AsPELUND & C. ERIKSEN, EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETrIoN LAW (3d ed. 1990) (comprehensive information on post-employment restrictive covenants).
2. Comment, Post Employment Restraints An Analysis of Theories of Enforcement, and a
Suggested Supplement to the Covenant Not to Compete, 17 TULSA LJ. 155, 155-56 (1981).
3. 14 S. WILLSTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS § 1633 (3d ed. 1972) states:
Any bargain or contract which purports to limit in any way the right of either party to
work or to do business, whether as to the character of the work or business, its place, the
manner in which it shall be done, or the price which shall be demanded for it, may be
called a bargain or contract in restraint of trade.
Id. at 78. See also Carpenter, Validity of ContractsNot to Compete, 76 U. PA. L. REv. 244 (1928).
4. Examples of a legislative and a judicial action invalidating post-employment restrictive covenants are OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 217 (Supp. 1990); H & R Block Inc. v. Lovelace, 208 Kan. 538,
493 P.2d 205 (1972), respectively.
5. Comment, supra note 2, at 155-56.
6. See 14 S. WILLISroN, supra note 3, § 1635; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs
§ 188 comment c (1979); Comment, supra note 2, at 156.
7. See 14 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 1633.
The old rule as to limitations of time and space with respect to contracts involving restraint
of trade has given way to the modern doctrine of reasonableness and the real test is never
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Since 1970, the trend in Oklahoma, like the majority ofjurisdictions,
has been to preserve reasonable post-employment restrictions. This
trend, however, is contrary to the language of title 15, section 217.8 This
statute, with two exceptions, defines all contracts restricting lawful professions as invalid. In Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard,9 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court appears to have disregarded the majority's
trend of judicial modification and, although not specifically stating such,
in effect reverted back to invalidating post-employment restrictive covenants. 10 The language in Pickard is confusing because it implies acceptance of the judicial modification approach but limits its use to a degree
that renders it virtually meaningless. The court determined that judicial
modification is prohibited if "essential terms" have to be added for the
covenant to be reasonable."1 The case is confusing because the court so
broadly interpreted "essential terms",12 that any alteration could be defined as an addition of an essential term. Therefore, any covenant could
potentially be considered unmodiflable and invalid. Because of the ambiguous language in Pickard it is unclear how to draft lawful post-employment restrictive covenants in Oklahoma.
This article analyzes Pickard and its possible effects on Oklahoma
law regarding post-employment restrictive covenants. A comparison of
the Pickard decision with the more commonly used judicial modification
approach illustrates that the latter approach is more equitable in determining the validity of post-employment restrictive covenants. Therefore,
the judicial modification approach which uses a rule of reason should be
statutorily adopted in Oklahoma. This can be accomplished by revising
the present statute to prevent only "unreasonable" contractual restrictions against trade.
'whether there is any restraint but always whether the restraint is reasonable under the facts
and circumstances of the particular case.
Id. at 80-81 (quoting Okerberg v. Crable, 185 Kan. 211, 214, 341 P.2d 966, 971 (1959)). See also
Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, 780 P.2d 1168, 1171 n.4 (Okla. 1989) (list of 27 jurisdictions
that use the judicial modification approach; of these 27, only two jurisdictions have a statutory
base-South Dakota and Hawaii); Comment, supra note 2, at 165-66 (listing jurisdictions that use
the judicial modification approach).
8. OKLA STAT. tit. 15, §§ 217-19 (Supp. 1990).
9. 780 P.2d 1168 (Okla. 1989).
10. Id. at 1173, 1175.
11. Id. at 1175.
12. Id. at 1170, 1173.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Facts
The controversy in Pickard concerned the validity of a series of

post-employment restrictive covenants between Bayly, Martin & Fay,
Inc. ("BMF") and Daniel D. Pickard.1 3 Pickard was president of the
Oklahoma division of BMF's insurance subsidiary.14 In order to advance
within the company, Pickard entered into three contracts during his employment: a covenant not to compete, an employment agreement and a

buy-sell agreement."5 Each contract incrementally increased Pickard's
post-employment restrictions, thus limiting his ability to continue his
chosen trade should he leave BMF.1 6 An important aspect of all three
contracts was that each contained a provision stating that it was the parties' intent to abide by the restrictive covenants to the fullest extent permissible within the bounds of the law. 7 Furthermore, the contracts
13. Id. at 1169. Initially Pickard was employed by Harlan Agents and Brokers, Inc. an affiliate
of Harlan Holding Company. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. (BMF), an affiliate of Bayly, Martin & Fay
Services, Inc., bought Harlan and became the assignee of Pickard's covenant not to compete. The
other two restrictive covenants Pickard signed as BMF's employee. These covenants restricted Pickard from rendering any services in competition with BMF or NBS. (NBS is an affiliate of Harlan that
was also purchased by BMF.) Id.
14. Brief for Appellant at 5-6, Pickard, (No. 70076); Telephone interview with Win. Brad
Heckenkemper Esq., BMFs attorney for the appeal (January 23, 1991).
15. Pickard, 780 P.2d at 1173-75. The first contract Pickard signed was a covenant not to
compete. Pickard signed this contract as an incentive for a prospective buyer to buy his stock in
Harlan Agents and Broker's Inc. ("Harlan"). After the prospective purchaser bought the stock, it
was subsequently assigned to BMF. The covenant not to compete restricted Pickard from working
in the insurance industry in any capacity for three years after the termination of his current employment. In addition, the covenant limited the geographical scope of the restrictions to Oklahoma,
Texas, and Colorado. Under the covenant, Pickard was forbidden from servicing any client of his
former employer. The term "client" was broadly defined to include any of BMF's customers during
the last three years of Pickard's employment or those who would become a client during the immediate three years after Pickard's termination. Id. at 1173-74.
Two days after Pickard signed the covenant not to compete, he entered into an employment
agreement with Harlan Agents and Broker's Inc., which was also subsequently assigned to BMF.
This agreement included restrictive covenants expanding the scope of clients with whom Pickard
was forbidden from conducting postemployment business. Thus, Pickard was not only restricted
from servicing clients that the company serviced for three years before and after Pickard's employment was terminated, but also from any customer that had conducted business with the company
during the time of his employment and any prospective customers contacted by the company before
Pickard was terminated. Id. at 1174.
The third contract was a buy-sell agreement signed on November 15, 1984. In this agreement
Pickard had the opportunity to buy eight-tenths of one percent (.8%) of BMF stock in exchange for
agreeing to further post-employment restrictions. Under the terms of the buy-sell agreement, the
postemployment restrictions on Pickard's activity were expanded beyond the insurance business to
any type of business in which BMF or its subsidiaries were involved. In addition to the restrictive
provisions in the previous contracts, this covenant prohibited the solicitation of any BMF clients or
employees which would likely cause them to discontinue activity with the company. Id. at 1174.
16. Id. at 1174.
17. Id. at 1175. The buy-sell agreement between Pickard and BMF Services, Inc. states that
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specifically invited judicial modification in order to prevent invalidation
if it were found that the covenants did not comply with applicable state
laws." Notwithstanding that it was the explicit intent of the parties to
allow for judicial modification of the covenants, the court still chose to
invalidate the restrictive covenants.1 9
Combined, the three restrictive covenants covered a broad geographical, temporal and occupational scope. When Pickard left BMF he
had collectively agreed to refrain from soliciting, selling or servicing any
of BMF's previous, current or prospective clients for a period of three
years following his termination. 20 The occupational restriction not only
encompassed clients in the insurance industry, but also included clients
in any of BMF's wide variety of subsidiaries.2"
A few months after Pickard quit, BMF filed suit alleging that he had
violated the restrictive covenants. 22 Although Pickard denied breaching
the provision of the covenants which prohibited him from soliciting
BMF's clients, he admitted selling and servicing insurance to BMF's clients after his termination. 23 Even though Pickard admitted to engaging
in these activities, the extent of the breach was never determined because
the trial court stayed discovery pending its decision on the legality of the
restrictive covenants.2 4 Despite the provision in the contracts inviting
judicial modification, the trial court held that the covenants were overly
"[i]t is the intention of each Employee Shareholder that the provisions of this paragraph shall be
enforced to the fullest extent permissible .... " Buy-Sell Agreement, § 7(d) at 15 (November 15,
1984) (copy of the buy-sell agreement is on file at the Tulsa Law Journal Offices).
18. Brief of Appellant at 7-8, Pickard(No. 70076). The language in the buy-sell agreement
inviting judicial modification states:
Each Employee Shareholder and the Company recognize that the laws and public policies
of the various states of the United States may differ as to the validity and enforceability of
covenants and undertakings similar to those set forth in this paragraph. It is the intention
of each Employee Shareholder that the provisions of this paragraph shall be enforced to the
fullest extent permissible under the laws and public policies of each state and jurisdiction in
which such enforcement is sought, and that the unenforceability (or the modification to
conform to such laws or public policies) of any provision thereof shall not render unenforceable, or impair, the remainder of the provisions thereof. Accordingly, if any provision
of this paragraph shall be determined to be invalid or unenforceable, either in whole or in
part, under the laws or public policies of any state or jurisdiction in which enforcement is
sought, as to such state or jurisdiction the provisions of this paragraph shall be deemed
amended to delete or modify, as necessary, the offending provision and to alter the balance
thereof in order to render it valid and enforceable in such state or jurisdiction.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
19. Pickard,780 P.2d at 1175.
20. Id. at 1174.
21. Id. at 1173-4.
22. Id. at 1169.
23. Brief of Appellant at 8, Pickard,(No. 70076).
24. Pickard,780 P.2d at 1170.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol26/iss3/4

4

Smith: Post-Employment Convenants Not to Compete--The Oklahoma View: Bay

1991]

POST-EMPLOYMENT COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE

429

restrictive and granted Pickard's motion for summary judgment.25 In so
ruling, the trial court failed to examine external facts relevant to the case.
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals agreed that the covenants were
overly restrictive, but rather than finding the covenants entirely invalid
modified them in a manner it thought would leave the contracts lawful.2 6
On certiorari, the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not explicitly disagree
with the court of appeals' approach. Instead it determined that the
broad occupational restrictions were still unreasonable.2 7 Rather than
modifying the remaining defective portions of the occupational restrictions the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that all three of the covenants
were invalid.2 8
B. Issue
At issue in Pickard was "whether a court may modify an otherwise
void covenant not to compete so that the covenant constitutes a reason30
able restraint on trade"2 9 under Oklahoma's restraint of trade statutes.
C. Holding
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court appeared to recognize the
practicality of using the rule of reason to preserve some restrictive contract provisions, it refused to apply the rule in Pickard.3 ' The court held
that covenants not to compete cannot be judicially modified to comply
with Oklahoma's restraint of trade statute if "essential elements" of the
contract must be provided in order to bring the covenant within the
scope of the rule of reason.3 2
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1170, 1173. The court of appeals only modified the geographical scope of the covenant leaving the overly broad occupation restrictions in place. Id.
27. Id. at 1173.
28. Id. at 1175.
29. Id. at 1169.
30. OKLA.STAT. tit. 15, § 217 (Supp. 1990). The statute states that "[e]very contract by which
any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, otherwise
than as provided by Sections 218 and 219 of this title, is to that extent void." Id. See infra note 36
for the text of the two exceptions, Sections 218 and 219 respectively.
31. Pickard, 780 P.2d at 1175.
32. Id. at 1170.
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OKLAHOMA'S LAW OF POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS BEFORE BAYLY, MARTIN & FAY, INC
V PICKARD

Oklahoma's restraint of trade statute,3 3 enacted in 1910, reflects the
anti-laissez faire approach to employer-employee relationships in the
early part of this century.34 The statute states that "[e]very contract by
which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or
business of any kind, otherwise than as provided by the next two sections
is to that extent void."' 35 The two statutory exceptions to this general
rule involve the sale of good will and the dissolution of partnerships.3 6
Although the goodwill exception was raised on appeal, neither exception
was found to apply in Pickard.31 Even though the language of Section
217 has not changed since 1910, interpretation of the statute by
Oklahoma courts has fluctuated over the years with changes in society.
A.

The TraditionalApproach

The 1948 case of E.S. MillerLaboratoryInc. v. Griffin 38 represents
the traditional approach to post-employment restrictive covenants. In
Griffin, the Oklahoma Supreme Court interpreted the restraint of trade
33. OKLA.STAT. tit. 15, § 217 (Supp. 1990). The invalidity of any restraint on trade is evidence
of the movement away from the laissez-faire doctrine.
34. BLAcK's LAW DIcIoNARY 827 (6th ed.1991). Laissez-faire is a political and economic
philosophy opposing governmental interference in economics beyond what is necessary to keep the
peace. This practice is characterized by a deliberate abstention of governmental interference in order
to allow the market place to operate freely. One emphasis of this theory is to allow individuals the
freedom to contract.
35. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 217 (Supp. 1990). The language in § 217 has remained unchanged
since 1910.
36. OiKLA. STAT. tit 15, §§ 218 & 219 (Supp. 1990). Section 218 is entitled "Restraint of
trade-Exception as to sale of goodwill" and states in part:
One who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying
on a similar business within a specified county... city or town or any part thereof, so long
as the buyer, or any person deriving title to the goodwill from him carries on a like business
therein.
Id. Section 219 is entitled "Restraint of trade-Exception as to partners" and states in part:
Partners may, upon or in anticipation of a dissolution of the partnership, agree that none of
them will carry on a similar business within a specified county.., city or town or any part
thereof.
Id.

37. Pickard,780 P.2d at 1170. The statutory exceptions involving the sale of a business and the
dissolution of a partnership did not apply. Section 2.18
was argued by BMF in the district court and
in the court of appeals because of the .8% of stock Pickard had received when he signed a buy-sell
agreement. Both courts rejected this argument and it was not presented on appeal to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court. Id.
38. 200 Okla. 398, 194 P.2d 877 (1948).
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statute literally and held that any contractual provision restraining a person from the pursuit of a lawful profession was invalid. Accordingly, former employers could not restrict competition from former employees.3 9
The court justified its literal statutory interpretation by concluding that
the language of the statute was clear - only those situations involving
the sale of a business or the dissolution of a partnership were exempt
from the statute's scope.' In contrast, the traditional common law rule
recognized five exceptions to restrictive post-employment covenants, one
of which allowed an employer to restrict a former employee from competing in a similar business. 4 1 Because this exception was available to the
Oklahoma legislature, the Griffin court reasoned that the legislature had
not intended to include it with the two statutory exceptions.4 2 This traditional approach exemplifies the original restraint of trade doctrine, which
has as its goal the preservation of competition. 3
B.

The Rule of Reason Approach

In 1970, the Oklahoma Supreme Court modified its previous position in Griffin and utilized a rule of reason analysis for evaluating postemployment restrictive covenants.44 The rule of reason involves the
modification of geographical, temporal, and occupational provisions in a
contract so that it can be enforced to the extent necessary to protect an
employer's legitimate needs without causing an undue hardship on the
employee or the general public. 5 In Tatum v. Colonial Life & Accident
Insurance Co.,46 the court determined that there are instances where limited post-employment restrictive covenants may be enforced.4 7 Here, the
court used a rule of reason to hold that a covenant restricting Tatum
from soliciting his former employer's clients for a period of two years
39. Id at 399, 194 P.2d at 879.
40. Id. See supra note 36.
41. 14 S. WILLsTON, supra note 3, § 1637, at 104-05. See also Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (five common law exceptions to invalidation of post-employment

restrictive covenants are discussed).
42. Griffln, 200 Okla. at 399, 194 P.2d at 878-79. The court recognized the common law exceptions to restraint of trade, but chose not to apply the exceptions that did not have a statutory base.

Id.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

14 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 1635, at 82-88.
Tatum v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 465 P.2d 448 (Okla. 1970).
Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 37 (Tenn. 1984).
465 P.2d 448 (Okla. 1970).
Id. at 452.
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was enforceable, meaning that only unreasonablerestrictions are unlawful under Oklahoma's restraint of trade statute.48 Tatum thus began
Oklahoma's use of the rule of reason in post-employment restrictive
covenants.
C.

FurtherDefinition of the Rule of Reason

The Oklahoma Supreme Court further explained the rule of reason
in two cases following the Tatum decision. Although the primary issue
in Board of Regents v. NCAA 4 9 and Crown Paint Co. v. Bankston50 involved Oklahoma's antitrust statutes,"' both cases also implicated the
same restraint of trade statute at issue in Pickard.52
In NCAA and Crown Paint, the court stressed the need to examine
the particular circumstances of each case in order to determine the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant. 53 The NCAA court further defined
the parameters of the rule of reason by identifying the public interest as
the primary element to be considered when evaluating the reasonableness
of a restrictive covenant.54 With public policy as the overriding concern,
48. Id. at 451.
Tatum and Pickardare similar in that both cases involve the relationship between salesmen and
insurance companies. The Tatum court identified the restrictive covenant as reasonablebecause it
contained only minimal occupational, temporal, and geographic limitations which did not entirely
limit Tatum from pursuing a lawful profession. The contract restricted only the solicitation of the
insurance company's clients for a period of two years. The court stated that this type of restriction

did not prevent Tatum from exercising a lawful profession, but rather was designed to maintain a
"hands-off" policy with respect to those whom Tatum knew to be insured by his former employer.
49. 561 P.2d 499 (Okla. 1977).
50. 640 P.2d 948 (Okla. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 946 (1982).
51. OKLA. STAT. tit. 79, § 1 (1981) states that "[e]very act, agreement, contract, or combination in the form of trust, or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce within this
state is hereby declared to be against public policy and illegal." Id. The Crown Paint court notes
that:
Because a liberal application of the provisions of [OKLA. STAT. tit. 79, § 1 (1971)] would
outlaw every conceivable contract or combination which could be made concerning trade
or commerce, courts have read into [such] statutes... a 'rule of reason', under which only
those acts, contracts, agreements or combinations which prejudice public interests by unduly restricting competition, or unduly obstructing the due course of trade, or which injuriously restrain trade, are unlawful.
Crown Paint, 640 P.2d at 950 (citations omitted).
52. OKLA.STAT. tit. 15, § 217 (Supp. 1990). NCAA, 561 P.2d at 508; Crown Paint,640 P.2d at
951-52.
53. NCAA, 561 P.2d at 508. (The court determines if a statute invalidates contracts in restraint
of trade by examining the reasonableness of the contract in view of the particular circumstances.

After an examination of the circumstances, if the court finds a contract unduly restrains trade, then
it is void, but if a contract is a reasonable restraint of trade, it is valid). See also Crown Paint, 640
P.2d at 952 (including the same emphasis on circumstances).
54. NCAA, 561 P.2d at 508. Public policy determines if contracts that are a restraint of trade
are valid and enforceable. If a contract is inimical to public interest, it is illegal. Id. See also Tatum
v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 465 P.2d 448, 452 (Okla. 1970).
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the court analyzed both the needs and interests of the contracting parties
in an effort to reach a just conclusion. After examining the circumstances of the case, the NCAA court determined that limiting the number
of assistant coaches in Division I schools was a reasonable restriction and
did not thwart public policy."5
In Crown Paint,the court addressed the validity of restrictive covenants on vertical competition in an industry.56 The court held that restrictive covenants between a manufacturer and a retailer that designate
a specific limited area as the exclusive territory of the retailer is reasonable.5 7 This example of vertical competition - competition "between
two parties operating on different market levels"5 8 - has been found to
be a reasonable restraint of trade. As in NCAA, the Crown Paintopinion
placed emphasis on applying the rule of reason only after an examination
of the specific circumstances of the case.5"
IV.

THE PICKARD DECISION

In Pickard,the Oklahoma Supreme Court set out a two-part test for
determining the enforceability of post-employment restrictive covenants.
First, the covenant must protect a legitimate interest of the employer
while at the same time not unduly restrain trade.' Second, the court
requires that reformation of an overly restrictive covenant which does
not protect a legitimate interest and unduly restrains trade not involve
the addition of essential terms or elements.6 1 Even though the court
failed to clarify what it meant by the "addition of essential terms", it
nevertheless determined that the covenants at issue failed both prongs of
the test.62
The covenants in Pickardfailed the first prong because portions of
55. NCAA, 561 P.2d at 508.
56. Crown Paint, 640 P. 2d at 952.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 951.
59. Id. at 952.
60. Pickard, 780 P.2d at 1172-73. The court's reasoning was based on H & R Block, Inc. v.
Lovelace, 208 Kan. 538, 493 P.2d 205 (1972). In Lovelace, the court decided that a post-employment restrictive contract was analogous to a liquidated damages clause because of its one-sided restrictions. In arriving at this conclusion, the court examined the specific circumstances involved in
the income tax-preparation business, the amount of competition in the restricted area and the reasonableness of the party's obligations. Id. at 543, 493 P.2d at 211.
61. Pickard, 780 P.2d at 1170. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 185 comment b
(1979). If the term is an essential part of the agreement, "the court will hold that the promise itself,
and perhaps the entire agreement, is unenforceable on grounds of public policy under the rule stated
in § 178." Id.
62. Id. at 1172-73.
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the covenants imposed overly restrictive, and therefore unjustified limitations on the employee's ability to continue his profession.6 3 A justifiable
restriction is one which allows the employer to compete on equal footing
with his or her former employee who is now in a similar business in the
same geographical area. 6" If a former employee obtains clients because
of connections with his or her former employer, then it is only fair that
the former employer should have a reasonable opportunity to try to retain his or her original customers. 65 The Pickard court refers to a Kansas Supreme Court case as support for its decision. In H & R Block Inc.
v. Lovelace66 the court concluded that the franchisor, author of the covenant, fully intended to unreasonably restrict the franchisee's geographical
sales area. Because the restriction was unnecessary and unjustified for
the protection of the franchisor's interest, the covenant was found to be
unreasonable.67
The Pickard court determined that the second prong of the test was
also not met, as it found that the covenants would have to be rewritten
instead of modified to be made reasonable.68 In Lovelace, as well as in
Pickard, the court declined to rewrite the contract on the basis that its
terms were unjustifiably broad and therefore restricted the employee
more than was needed to protect the employer's legitimate interests.69
The Pickard court, however, did note that "judicial modification is justified if the contractual defect can be cured by imposition of reasonable
limitations concerning the activities embraced, time, or geographical limitations. '70 Despite its apparent approval of the judicial modification approach, the Pickard court refused to modify the covenants because
material elements would have to be added.
All three unmodifiable "essential elements" referred to by the court
in Pickard were occupational related defects. The provisions involved:
1) client servicing or solicitation; 2) restriction from competing in unrelated lines of business; and 3) restrictions on the sale of different types of
insurance. 7 1 Although the geographical modification made by the court
63. Id. at 1173-74.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONMACS § 188 comment d (1979). See also infra notes
99-101 for examples of courts decisions which have placed parties on equal footing so neither had an
unfair advantage.
65. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 188 comment d (1979).
66. 208 Kan. 538, 493 P.2d 205 (1972).
67. Id. at 547, 493 P.2d at 212-13.
68. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pickard, 780 P.2d 1168, 1173 (Okla. 1989).
69. 208 Kan. at 547, 493 P.2d at 212-13.
70. Pickard, 780 P.2d at 1173.
71. Id.
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of appeals was accepted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, it was deemed
insufficient to cure the occupational related defects.72

Thus, the

Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that the court of appeals erred in
its modification of the Pickard covenants.73 This conclusion was not
based on rejection of the judicial modification theory, but rather because
modification was inappropriate due to the covenant's unjustifiably broad
occupational restrictions. 74 Additionally, although each covenant expressly invited the court to reshape overly restrictive terms into an acceptable form, the court declined to accept the invitation.7" The court
held that in order to cure the occupational related defects the covenants
would have to be rewritten rather than modified and thus were invalid.76
IV.

A.

ANXLYSIS

Background

The judicial modification approach is the most widely accepted view
with regard to post-employment restrictive covenants.7 7 This approach
allows a court to use a rule of reason to judicially modify post-employment restrictive covenants in order to balance the parties' and public's
legitimate interests so as to arrive at a reasonable agreement between the
parties.78
Although section 217 prohilits any restraints on a lawful profession,7 9 the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Pickard interpreted the statute
to mean that "[c]ovenants not to compete may not be modified judicially
to bring the contract within the rule of reason if the court would be required to supply essential contractual terms." 8 In applying this limitation, the court gave a broad reading to what constitutes providing
"essential elements" by holding that the overly restrictive occupational
covenants could not be modified.8 1 Because the court failed to clarify
what is or is not an "essential element," Pickardoffers little guidance to
attorneys attempting to draft lawful post-employment covenants.
72. Id.

73. Id. at 1175.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1172, 1175.
1175. See supra note 18 for language of the invitation.
1175.
1171 n.4 (listing the states and their applicable cases which have adopted the majority

view of judicial modification for post-employment restrictive covenants).
78. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188, at 41 (1979).
79. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
80. Pickard, 780 P.2d at 1172 (this decision does not affirmatively state that judicial modification would be allowed if essential terms did not have to be supplied).

81. Id. at 1175.
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Although the court did not expressly abandon the rule of reason
standard, the practical effect of Pickard seems to do just that. If this was
the court's intent, it could have based its decision on a literal interpretation of the statute alone.12 Instead, the court implied that a rule of reason could be applicable in some instances, but then failed to define those
particular occasions.8 3 Thus, the practical effect of Pickardis no different than if the court had applied section 217 in a literal sense. That is,
the standard is now so uncertain that any restrictive covenant will likely
be invalid; a result similiar to a literal interpretation of the statute.
B. Application of the Rule of Reason
Rather than applying the rule of reason, the Pickard court invalidated the post-employment restrictive covenants on the basis that they
were incapable of saving because "essential terms" would have to be added. 4 Once the court determined the covenants were unjustifiably restrictive it disregarded the explicit provision in the contract identifying
the parties' intent to allow judicial modification if necessary to bring the
covenants within the bounds of the law.8" The parties' invitation to modify the covenant along with a standard application of the rule of reason
indicates a simple and perhaps more equitable method to resolve this
case. Furthermore, overly broad occupational covenants such as the one
at issue are exactly the type of restrictions the rule of reason was developed to address.8 6 As discussed earlier, the rule of reason is a method of
analysis to define the reasonableness of a contract by examining the geographical, temporal and occupational factors in the covenant. 87 Therefore, in light of the invitation to modify the contract provisions, the court
would not be inappropriately providing essential terms, but rather would
be equalizing the covenant's effect on the parties by modifying the existing terms so as to better accommodate the parties' interests and
88
intentions.
As previously noted, the three disputed restrictions addressed by the
court were: 1) client-servicing or solicitation; 2) restrictions from competing in unrelated lines of business; and 3) restrictions on the sale of
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See supra text accompanying note 35.
Pickard, 780 P.2d at 1172-73.
Id. at 1175.
See supra note 18.
Pickard,780 P.2d at 1172-73.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
See supra note 18.
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different types of insurance.8 9 These restrictions relate directly to the
occupational component of the rule of reason. Therefore, to correct the
three occupational related elements that were unacceptable to the Pickard majority, a court could modify the unsatisfactory portion and make
it a type of "lesser included" provision.' This would not be a creation of
essential terms, but merely modification of an existing occupational
provision.
Once modified, a previously broad term should reflect reasonable
limits, resulting in acceptable restrictions. 9 1 For instance, the first occupational related provision the Pickard court rejected involved a restriction which prohibited Pickard from servicing or soliciting BMF's past,
present, andfuture clients. In some instances, a covenant preventing clients from choosing with whom they will conduct business is unreasonable, whereas a covenant restricting the solicitation of a former employer's
current clients is considered reasonable. 92 This provision could be cured
by judicially modifying the covenant to restrict Pickard only from soliciting BMF's current clients. Pickard would then be allowed to service
BMF's clients that solicit him, but would be prohibited from soliciting
BMF's current clients that were known to Pickard through his association with BMF. This limitation would allow BMF a reasonable chance
to renew its association with the clients that it had once assigned to Pickard. To comply with the rule of reason, all occupational restrictions
must be limited by reasonable time and geographic boundaries. Neither
the three-year time period nor the county-wide geographical93limitation
was challenged by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Pickard.
The second and third provisions the court rejected involved restrictions from competing in unrelated lines of business and from selling dissimilar types of insurance. All that is required to modify the second and
third provisions94 is the revision of two words: "unrelated" to "related"
89. Pickard,780 P.2d at 1173.
90. "Lesser included" refers to retaining a segment of an existing contractual term and eliminating the offensive portion in order to make the covenant less restrictive. This approach is similar to
the "Blue Pencil Approach" used in many jurisdictions which are opposed to either re-writing or
adding new elements to contracts in order to make them reasonable and therefore legal. See generally Comment, supra note 2, at 160.
91. Crown Paint Co. v. Bankston, 640 P.2d 948 (Okla. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 946 (1982);
Tatum v. Colonial Life and Accident Ins. Co., 465 P.2d 448 (Okla. 1970).

92. Tatum, 465 P.2d at 451.
93. Pickard, 780 P.2d at 1173-75. Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not render a
ruling as to the reasonableness of the geographical and temporal limitations, it implied that they
were acceptable.
94. Id. at 1173.
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and "dissimilar" to "similar." Therefore, a covenant is reasonable if it
restricts the former employee only from related types of business or,
more specifically, from selling the same product.
Although these suggested limitations are based on what has been
considered reasonable restrictions in other jurisdictions,9" an examination of the particular circumstances surrounding a restrictive covenant
must be conducted in order to equitably modify restrictive covenants.
The primary purpose of the judicial modification approach is to devise a
fair resolution to overly restrictive covenants.9 6 This can only be done if
the facts of the case are evaluated to determine what is reasonable under
the circumstances of the particular case.
C.

Discovery

An examination of the facts of the case was necessary to enable the
proper evaluation of the parties' and the public's legitimate interests.97
The specific circumstances surrounding Pickardwere never examined because the trial court's summary judgment decision precluded an evidentiary hearing.9 8 Thus, granting summary judgment eliminated the
possibility of a thorough investigation into the circumstances of the case.
Such an investigation was necessary to properly apply the rule of reason
and its equitable balances. 9 9 The court should have reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case so that a complete inquiry could
have been made into the external circumstances surrounding the
contract.
Oklahoma's restraint of trade cases prior to Pickardallowed discovery so that a thorough examination of the circumstances surrounding the
case could be made in order to properly implement the rule of reason and
its equitable balances."
For example, in both Board of Regents v.
NCAA1 Io and Crown Paint Co. v. Bankston,"0 2 the court undertook a
complete examination of the respective industries involved to determine
whether the restrictive covenants were reasonable. The fact that the
95. Whittenberg v. Williams, 135 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1943); Short v. Fahrney, 502 P.2d 982 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1972); Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Kappers, 488 P.2d 96 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971);
System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983); Tench v. Weaver, 374 P.2d 27 (Wyo.
1962).
96. 14 S. W-LLsTON, supra note 3, §§ 1637-38, at 103.
97. 14 S. WILLImSoN, supra note 3, § 1638, at 108.
98. Pickard, 780 P.2d at 1178 (Opala, V.CJ., dissenting).
99. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.
101. 561 P.2d 499 (Okla. 1977).
102. 640 P.2d 948 (Okla. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 946 (1982).
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Pickardcourt cited both of these cases as examples of Oklahoma's use of
the rule of reason lends validity to the requirement of discovery in order
to properly evaluate the reasonableness of post-employment restrictive
covenants. However, even though the Pickard court acknowledged use
of discovery in previous cases, it nonetheless afflirmed a summary judgment prior to the examination of external facts. This decision clearly
circumvented the purpose of the rule of reason.
Even in H & R Block Inc. v. Lovelace,1 3 a case cited favorably by
Pickard,"' a thorough examination of the surrounding circumstances
was performed before determining that the restriction was unjustified."0 5
In Lovelace, an investigation of the income tax-preparation industry was
done by examining the amount of competition in the restricted geographical area." 6 The court concluded that the rule of reason should not be
the restrictive covimplemented because the circumstances revealed that
10 7
enants were unnecessarily and unjustifiably broad.
In contrast, the Pickardcourt looked only to the contract language.
The court could not analyze any external circumstances because it did
not allow discovery. If discovery had been allowed, relevant circumstances could have been considered to arrive at a more informed result.
Judicial modification after discovery is the method used by the majority
of jurisdictions.10 Hence, attorneys in these jurisdictions are able to
draft post-employment covenants without the type of confusion that
stems from the Pickard case.
D. A Renewed Emphasis on the TraditionalApproach
In Scott v. Snelling & Snelling Inc., 11 the Federal District Court for
the Northern District of California placed renewed emphasis on a literal
interpretation of the states restraint of trade statute, a statute similar to
that of Oklahoma's.110 The court rejected the judicial modification approach on public policy grounds. 1 ' The court followed the general rule
103. 208 Kan. 538, 493 P.2d 205 (1972). See also text accompanying notes 67-68.
104. 780 P.2d at 1172-73.
105. Lovelace, 208 Kan. at 544, 493 P.2d at 210-11.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

d at 542, 493 P.2d at 209.
Id. at 547, 493 P.2d at 212-13.
See 14 S. WIuLsToN, supra note 3, § 1633, at 80.
732 F. Supp. 1034 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990).
732 F. Supp. at 1042.
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of contruction that statutes should not be interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of their language unless a clearly ex-

pressed legislative intent exists.112 Scott cites Pickard in support of its
decision to invalidate a post-employment covenant on the basis that such
a covenant is contrary to the state's public policy. 113 Although the Pickard court did not explicitly discuss public policy as a basis for its decision, the two cases are similar in their outcome. 114
Pickard and Scott both acknowledged that the rule of reason may at
times apply only to partial restrictions on competition; however, geographical and temporal categories are not necessarily recognized as partial restrictions.' 15 Unlike Pickard, however, the Scott court further
clarified the use of this statute by defining that the only appropriate deviations from the literal interpretation of the statute are the statutorily created exceptions.' 6 In contrast, the language in Pickard implies that the
rule of reason may be applied to any covenant so long as essential terms
17
do not have to be provided.'
Even though Scott cites Pickard in support of its decision to invalidate post-employment covenants,I" the Pickardcourt does not explicitly
emphasize the same public policy argument against limiting competition
as does the Scott case. The language in Pickard emphasizes the reluctance to provide essential terms of a contract rather than the public policy of pro-competition." 9 That the Pickard court so broadly interprets
"providing essential terms," however, suggests that any post-employment covenant could be ruled invalid. This, in turn, gives the impression
that the Oklahoma Supreme Court places more emphasis on the traditional public policy of promoting competition that a cursory reading of
Pickard suggests. That is, the court has effectively returned to a procompetition interpretation of section 217 without expressly doing so. Inasmuch as the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not address the issue of
112. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982).
113. Scott, 732 F. Supp. at 1042 n.11.
114. In Pickard and Scott, the trial courts found post-employment restrictive covenants to be
against public policy. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision in Pickard.
However, its decision was based on the inability of the court to add essential elements to the con-

tract. Because of the court's broad interpretation of what constituted adding essential terms, the
effect of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision is parallel with that ofScott. Pickard, 780 P.2d at

1170; Scott, 732 F. Supp. at 1045.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Scott, 732 F. Supp. at 1043. Pickard,780 P.2d at 1175.
Scott, 732 F. Supp. at 1040-42.
Pickard,780 P.2d at 1170.
Scott, 732 F. Supp. at 1042.

119. Pickard,780 P.2d at 1170.
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public policy, it is difficult to be certain as to the accuracy of this
impression.
E. Problems and Approaches
As a result of Pickard, drafting lawful post-employment restrictive
covenants is a difficult task. The plain language in section 217120 may
mislead unwary researchers to assume that the statute's clear and unambiguous language is valid. Whereas, the Oklahoma Supreme Court's latest interpretation of the statute allows judicial modification unless
essential elements need to be supplied.12 1 Even after uncovering
Oklahoma's recent interpretation of the restraint of trade statute there is
no reason to assume, based on past fluctuation,12 2 that this will be the
permanent interpretation. Thus, the Oklahoma legislature should address and correct this confusing issue.
Moreover, an attorney drafting post-employment restrictive covenants in Oklahoma can only speculate as to the covenants validity. Even
an overly restrictive covenant that appropriately gives added consideration for the restriction would likely be unenforceable. 2 3 Depending on
the circumstances, this could lead to an unconscionable and inequitable
result for the contracting parties. Unconscionability is usually associated
with an employee's unequal bargaining power.12 4 According to
Oklahoma's view, however, the employer has the disadvantage. The employee could foreseeably get an unjustifiable windfall by receiving compensation in return for agreeing to overly restrictive post-employment
120. See supra text accompanying note 35.
121. See supra note 35 and accompanying text for language of the restraint of trade statute. See
also Pickard, 780 P.2d at 1172.

122. See supra notes 38-59 and accompanying text for examples of Oklahoma's fluctuation in
this area.
123. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 comment b (1979) states that not all restrictive covenants should be invalid. See also supra note 98 for examples of when overly restrictive
covenants should be allowed in order to protect legitimate interests.
124. Comment, "Common Callings" and the Enforcement or Postemployment Covenants in
Texas, 19 ST. MARY'S LJ. 589, 597 (1987) (describing the theory of unconscionability).

The modem notion of unconscionability is codified in section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, where the commentary suggest as a test 'whether, in light of the general
commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the
clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing
at the time of the making of the contract.' In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
[350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)], the [court] described unconscionability as 'an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party.'
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covenants that would later be invalidated. 125 This treatment of restrictive covenants could promote "bad faith" agreements made by employees
who know that the overly broad post-employment covenants will be invalidated rather than reasonably modified. Furthermore, employers may
not be able to adequately protect themselves because if the covenants are
too detailed the contract may be struck down simply as boilerplate. To
combat this problem, full disclosure of the facts needs to be made. Regardless of whether the theory of unconscionabiity 126 is used to the favor
of employees or employers, reaching an equitable result depends heavily
upon a full factual development. Anything less can easily lead to an inequitable result. Additionally, the uncertainty in the law created by the
Pickard version of the judicial modification approach might entice attorneys to become more creative when drafting employment covenants.
Possible options include an approach exemplified in the Montana case of
Dobbins, Deguirer & Tucker, P.C. v. MacDonald & Olson,12 which involved interpretation of a restraint of trade statute identical to

Oklahoma's.1 2 The contract at issue allowed former employees to solicit
their former employer's clients.1 29 In Dobbins, an accounting firm specifically allowed its former employees to solicit the firm's clients in return
for a "reasonable" fee for each client taken. 3 The fee consisted of one
hundred percent of the gross fees billed by Dobbins during the last year
of association with the client. 3 1 This amount could be paid out in

monthly installments for three years at eight percent interest or in a lump

sum payment.' 32 The Montana Supreme Court, in an unanimous decision, held that the covenant was not against Montana's restraint of trade
statute. 133 Historically, remedies at law have been found inadequate for
breaches of post-employment agreements;1 34 however, this approach
might prove an acceptable alternative.
125. Id.
126. See supra note 124.
127. 218 Mont. 392, 708 P.2d 577 (1985).
128. See supra text accompanying note 35 for Oklahoma's restraint of trade statute. See MONT.
CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (1987) for Montana's restraint of trade statute which has the same wording
as Oklahoma's restraint of trade statute.
129. Dobbins, 218 Mont. at 393, 708 P.2d at 578.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id at 394, 708 P.2d at 578.
133. Id. at 397, 708 P.2d at 580.
134. See generally A. CORIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRAcTS 91-117 (1964) (discussion of specific
performance and adequacy of remedy); J. JACKSON, CoNTRAcT LAW IN MODERN SociTY at 183
(1973). See also supra note 95 (court decisions in accordance with equitable remedies for postemployment restrictive covenants); H & R Block v. Lovelace, 208 Kan. 538, 493 P.2d 205 (1972).
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Another possible method to circumvent the Pickard decision would
be to incorporate a "choice of law" provision in the contract. A choice
of law provision, identifying an appropriate state, could allow the drafting attorney to be certain of the validity of the substance of his or her
contract. The inherent problem with the choice of law option is that
courts may not give force to provisions that violate the forum state's pub135
lic policy.
The best option, however, would be for the legislature to revise the
1910 language in the restraint of trade statute in order to reflect the modem equitable view on post-employment restrictive covenants. The statute could be modified to reflect the equitable view by adding the word
"unreasonable"; specifically inviting reformation; and including a provision that would grant the parties a reasonable opportunity to present evidence that would aid the court in making a determination. An example
of the revision is as follows:
1) Every contract by which any one is unreasonablyrestrained from
exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, otherwise than as provided by the next two sections is to that extent
void.
2) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of
the contract to have been unreasonable, the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unreasonable clause, or it may so limit the application of any reasonable clause as to avoid any unreasonable
result.
3) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unreasonable, the parties shall be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to the industry setting, purpose 136
and effect to aid the court in making the
determination.
If such a revision was made the courts would be free to judicially modify
restrictive covenants by using the rule of reason and could therefore
avoid the interpretation problems and the resulting confusion that has
arisen from Pickard.
Although this proposal invites judicial modification, the final decision whether to modify would be left to the courts in order to guard
against intentional overreaching or unconscionability by either party.
135. Scott v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1034 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
136. This recommendation is based on the language in OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-302 (1981 &
Supp. 1990). Section 2-302 is Oklahoma's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code's treatment of
unconscionability; therefore, alterations have been made in order for the language to apply to postemployment covenants.
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The courts are in a better position than the legislature to make the most
equitable decision on a case by case basis. Therefore, a great deal of
discretion will be allotted to the courts in order to make its determinations. Because of the discretion there will still be some confusion surrounding the outcome of cases involving these types of covenants. Even
though there still can be some uncertainty as to the covenants' enforceability, drafters of such covenants will know of the courts' choices and
will likely draft post-employment covenants accordingly.
V.

CONCLUSION

The rule of reason has been used by most courts when confronted
with determining the reasonableness of post-employment restrictive covenants. The judicial modification approach allows the court to evaluate
the facts of a particular case in order to modify excessive occupational,
temporal, and geographical restrictions. Even if a statute prohibits such
covenants, allowing judicial modification would lead to a more equitable
result. In Plckard the court chose not to use the rule of reason because,
in its view, essential terms of the contract would have to be supplied in
order to make the covenants reasonable. Because the "essential elements" in question fall within the parameters of the occupational category provided for in the rule of reason analysis, it is clear that the more
equitable rule of reason is a more appropriate rule of decision as opposed
to simply finding the entire covenant unreasonable and invalid.
A more equitable outcome could have been achieved through remand of the case to the trial court for discovery. Once all of the circumstances surrounding the contract and the insurance industry had been
revealed, the court could have better determined whether the covenants
were reasonable. If after examining the facts of the particular case, the
court should find that the covenants are unreasonable or against public
policy, a rule of reason analysis should ensue. Because the rule of reason
analysis produces more equitable results, it should be the approach
adopted in Oklahoma - either by the courts or preferably, by the
legislature.

Ann N. Smith
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